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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT GOODWIN’S PAPER IS NOT ABOUT…
At first sight, it might seem that, in “The Authority of Wikipedia,” Jean Goodwin is
going to deal with a very useful, specific and not particularly philosophical matter,
namely, whether we should consult Wikipedia at all. Goodwin incidentally remarks that,
for teachers, it is a hot issue whether Wikipedia is an advisable pedagogical device. And
certainly, in general, it may be interesting to know whether consulting Wikipedia is
something sound to do if we are looking for information. Such a kind of concern should
be placed in the realm of practical reason, as it amounts to try to determine the adequacy
and efficiency of a certain means—i.e. consulting Wikipedia- to a certain end—i.e.
getting information about different topics. For this concern, the target question would be
“is consulting Wikipedia a good deal indeed?,” and the way to answer it would be an
empirical research and the subsequent appraisal of its costs, risks and rewards as a source
of information. But, this is not Goodwin’s question.
There is a different concern that Goodwin’s paper seems to address. This time, it
is a concern belonging to the realm of theoretical reason, as it amounts to try to determine
the theoretical correctness of the information that Wikipedia provides. For it, the target
question would be “is the information conveyed in Wikipedia right or (sufficiently)
justified?” and the way to answer it would be, again, an empirical research determining
the fulfillment of certain epistemological criteria—namely, criteria sanctioning the
theoretical correctness of the information that Wikipedia provides.
Remarkably, both determining the pragmatic adequacy of consulting Wikipedia as
a source of information and determining the theoretical adequacy of the information that
it provides can be said to be epistemological tasks. But the former is a matter of the
correctness of the activity of consulting Wikipedia as a means to the specific end of
having (sound, adequate) knowledge, whereas the latter is a matter of Wikipedia’s
intrinsic quality as an “alleged” corpus of knowledge. However, none of these tasks is
Goodwin’s main target –although, as I will argue in next section, the second one is part of
Goodwin’s main goal.
Rather, Goodwin says that she is going to “[…] consider a series of possible
rationales for trusting Wikipedia, before proposing (her) own […]” (2009, p. 3). The
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issue of the trustworthiness of Wikipedia can be seen as a matter of the theoretical
adequacy of the beliefs that we acquire as a result of consulting it, but also of the
pragmatic adequacy of consulting it as a source of information. But Goodwin is not
primarily interested in considering whether Wikipedia is a good means for knowledge,
nor does she try to establish the theoretical correctness of the information that Wikipedia
conveys; at least, not directly. Rather, she aims at determining which criteria should we
follow in order to determine, in turn, whether Wikipedia is trustable or not. And her
contention will be that we “[…] trust Wikipedia on pragmatic, not on epistemic, grounds”
(2009, p. 15). It is this main thesis what I would like to discuss in the following
comments.
2. A TWOFOLD AMBIGUITY IN GOODWIN’S SECONDARY GOAL
There is a further remark to be made in order to properly characterize Goodwin’s project.
For, at the beginning of her article, she also says:
I consult Wikipedia. I am, further, no epistemic slouch; in fact I consider myself prudent in
deciding what to credit. The purpose of this paper is to reconcile these two facts, by articulating
the rationale which will make my trust in Wikipedia not only reasonable, but manifestly so. (2009,
p. 1)

As already said, Goodwin’s main goal is to provide an adequate rationale for
determining whether Wikipedia is trustable or not. But, as a result, she will also try to
show that Wikipedia is trustable indeed, so that she will be showing that trusting
Wikipedia is “not only reasonable, but manifestly so.” However, in my view, the
expression of the latter goal is ambiguous in at least two senses.
In principle, Goodwin seems to aim at redeeming the rationality of those who trust
the Free Encyclopaedia, like herself. But taking into account the above distinction
between the theoretical and the pragmatic epistemic justification of trusting Wikipedia, I
think we would have to ask, first, whether she is talking about their theoretical or their
pragmatic rationality. For the former would be a matter of answering the question “are
those who believe what Wikipedia says right in believing so?” whereas the latter would
be a matter of answering the slightly different question “are those who consult Wikipedia
right in doing so, provided that they aim at getting information?”
I think this is an important distinction. For, on the one hand, it might be
(theoretically) wrong from me to believe what Wikipedia says about, let’s say,
dolphins—for example, because I think that Wikipedia is, in general, not very accurate—
while it is (pragmatically) right from me to consult Wikipedia for getting information
about dolphins. That would be the case, for example, if it happens to be a good option to
start my research about dolphins by consulting the corresponding entries, but just as a
starting point for further research. If I do so, I am still trusting Wikipedia as a means for
knowledge. Actually, I think that’s the way we should endorse its pedagogical use.
And conversely, it might be (theoretically) right from me to believe what
Wikipedia says about dolphins—for example, because I think that Wikipedia is mostly
right—while it is (pragmatically) wrong from me to consult it. That would be the case if I
have more accurate, more accessible, more fancy, more acknowledged, etc sources of
information for my research. Arguably, this fact would partly explain the feeling that
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there is something strange in a dolphin specialist seriously and instrumentally—that is,
not for curiosity or fun, or for getting knowledge about Wikipedia itself, etc—consulting
Wikipedia’s entries on dolphins. Goodwin herself seems to acknowledge this intuition by
remarking that her consulting “Argumentation Theory” or “Informal Logic” was “out of
curiosity” (2009, p. 8). Thus, even if we think that Wikipedia’s information is basically
and mostly right, its generality and anti-expert style would tell against using it as a main
academic source: specialists are supposed to use more “fancy” sources of knowledge…
This is also something Goodwin seems to acknowledge when she mentions the despair
with which many scholars see the possibility of consulting Wikipedia (2009, p. 2).
On the other hand, we have to take into account that, whereas the concerns
outlined in section 1 were about the theoretical and pragmatic adequacy of Wikipedia as a
source of information, the ones we are considering now are about the theoretical and
pragmatic rationality of those who consult Wikipedia or believe what it says. Certainly
there is a sense in which both pairs of question happen to be the same, namely, the sense
in which saying of a person that she is (theoretically or pragmatically) right in doing or
believing that p means the same as saying that p is (theoretically or pragmatically) right.
But, in principle, we should not grant the identity of both types of questions. For we may
want to preserve the idea that it might happen to be (theoretically or pragmatically)
wrong to look at Wikipedia as a source of information or to believe what it says, while it
was (theoretically or pragmatically) right for someone to do so, as long as it coheres with
her beliefs and/or desires. This idea amounts to acknowledge that, in a certain way,
people may be wrong and still being rational. And vice versa: even if what Wikipedia
says were true or if it were an utmost valuable source of information, there is a sense in
which it would be wrong for a given subject to believe what it says or to consult it,
namely, the sense in which it would be unreasonable from her to believe what it says or
to consult it as a source of information if she distrust Wikipedia or unreasonably prefers
another source of information. This is just to gather the idea that, sometimes, we happen
to be right just by chance.
Taking all this into account, I will contend that Goodwin’s goal of providing a
rationale for trusting Wikipedia happens to be the goal of providing criteria for
determining Wikipedia’s theoretical adequacy, i.e. criteria for determining whether what
Wikipedia says can be taken to be (mostly) right. Following these criteria, she would try
to show that Wikipedia is theoretically trustable indeed and, as a consequence, that those
who consult Wikipedia are pragmatically right in doing so. In order to achieve the latter
goal, however, Goodwin would have to presuppose not only that if a set of claims is
theoretically correct, then those who believe them are theoretically rational, but also that
if Wikipedia is such a set of theoretically correct claims, then it is pragmatically right to
consult it as a source of information. But as argued above, these presuppositions are not
warranted, so I would rather give up the analysis of the latter goal and focus just on the
first and the second one 1 .
1

Actually, I think the following italics by Goodwin grant my decision: “I am going to presume here that
reliance on Wikipedia is reasonable” (2009: 1). My guess is that Goodwin does not really aim at redeeming
the reasonability of those who trust Wikipedia, but of Wikipedia itself (either as a means to the end of
knowing, or as a body of “alleged” knowledge—i.e. as a set of claims). It may be difficult to admit that
doing or believing something may be reasonable independently of its reasonability for someone. But, as
argued above, we already endorse this distinction when we say that someone was right, but just by chance,
or that she was wrong, but still rational. In my view, by saying that consulting Wikipedia is reasonable,
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Now, regarding Goodwin’s primary goal of showing that the adequate criteria for
determining the theoretical adequacy of Wikipedia are “pragmatic, not epistemic,” my
main goal in this comments will be, in turn, to show that Goodwin is not really proposing
“pragmatic” criteria for appraising Wikipedia’s information, but what we should call
“second order theoretical criteria.” And as long as this contention might seem a merely
linguistic matter, I would like to show that my proposed labels for “pragmatic,”
“theoretic” and “epistemic” are able to grasp some distinctions that Goodwin’s aren’t.
This is indeed a poor criticism, which is another way of saying that, in general, I’m very
sympathetic to the ideas defended in “The Authority of Wikipedia.”
3. EPISTEMOLOGY
REDUCTIONISM

OF

TESTIMONY.

REDUCTIONISM

AND

ANTI-

Goodwin locates the question of the epistemological status of our trust in Wikipedia
within the realm of the epistemology of testimony. Roughly, testimony epistemologists
hold two main—and commonly held as incompatible—positions. For the reductionist—
Hume being a main withstander—in order to be justified in believing what others say we
have to have (good) reasons for trusting them. On the contrary, anti-reductionists see
testimony as self-justifying, that is, as something similar to other forms of direct
judgment, like perception or memory, whose justification is rather a matter of not having
reasons for disbelief.
Thus, for the reductionist, the theoretical correctness of a belief acquired by
testimony would finally rest on different reasons warranting that, in a particular case, the
testimony given is likely true. On the contrary, for the anti-reductionist, the theoretical
correctness of a belief acquired by testimony is a matter of the a priori acceptability of
the idea that it is theoretically right to believe others’ assertions, unless there are good
reasons to doubt them. Thus, no reasons would be needed in order to justify many of the
beliefs that we acquire as a result of what others say to us. The a priori acceptability of
such a thesis has been defended considering things like the constitutive conditions of
asserting or the impossibility of massively attributing false beliefs.
But it is important to take into account that both reductionists and antireductionists discuss about the epistemic credentials of the beliefs that we acquire as a
result of a very specific kind of testimony, namely, the case in which there is no salient
reason to believe, nor to disbelieve, what the other says—like the testimony of a person
that we meet in the middle of the street and, in being asked, tells us what time is it, or
where is Boulevard Street.
Main possible reasons for disbelieving are the evidence that the witness aims at
deceiving us, or that she is committing a mistake. But it is also a good reason for
disbelieving the fact that what the speaker says is too controversial to be accepted without
Goodwin is saying that, unless there are specific circumstances for particular individuals telling against it,
we do well in trusting Wikipedia. In other words, I think Goodwin is making a claim about Wikipedia, she
is saying something interesting about it, not about the peculiarities of those who consult it. Certainly, that
means that what she would be saying about Wikipedia itself would be something quite close to what Locke
called “secondary qualities,” like colors, which depend on the existence of humans: that x is green is a
property of x, given how humans actually are. But secondary qualities are perfectly objective.
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further explanations, or that it is too strange or complex, or just incompatible with many
of our beliefs 2 . In this sense, Wikipedia does not seem to be the type of testimony we
could accept without further questioning, for it provides specialized information in a
systematic way. It claims are not like those of the person who tells us what time is it or
where is Boulevard Street, for the complexity of its entries increases the probability that it
contain, at least, some mistakes.
Goodwin herself acknowledges that “Wikipedia is of course an extreme case. In
less extreme cases, we often have good epistemic as well as pragmatic reasons for relying
on what others tell us” (2009, p. 15). Consequently, as long as Wikipedia is not the
standard type of testimony about which reductionists and anti-reductionists discuss, the
fact that Goodwin (and me) thinks that we need reasons to turn our trust in Wikipedia
into a theoretically right one does not amount to adopt a reductionist conception of the
justifiability of the beliefs that we acquire by testimony.
4. GOODWIN’S EVALUATION OF THREE POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR
TRUSTING WIKIPEDIA
So, Wikipedia is not a standard case of testimony, and there is no possibility of a priori
establishing Wikipedia’s trustworthiness or the rationality of the beliefs that we acquire
as a result of consulting it. That is why Goodwin goes on to consider three types of
rationales for determining the trustworthiness of the Free Encyclopaedia: the expertise of
the individual author, the collective knowledge emerging from the sort of interactions that
Wikipedia allows, and the success of past experiences of trust.
Regarding the possibility of justifying our trust in Wikipedia by considering the
expertise of the individual authors, Goodwin says that:
the anonymity or pseudonymity of Wikipedia editors prevents us from assessing their knowledge;
what we do know of these editors does not make us confident; and the anti-expert culture of
Wikipedia doesn’t give us reason to believe that these conditions will change. The knowledge of
individual contributors does not appear to justify our practice of consulting Wikipedia. (2009, pp.
4-5)

I think this is plainly right: the interesting thing about the Wikipedia case is
showing that, in dealing with the epistemological status of the beliefs that we acquire by
testimony, we do not deal with the trustworthiness of speakers themselves. Rather, as
Goodwin insists recalling Moran (2006), we deal with the trustworthiness of their
particular communicative actions at a given occasion; and the speaker’s general
trustworthiness as a person is just one reason among others for trusting what she says at
that time.
On the other hand, Goodwin notices, Wikipedia’s structure enables a very
peculiar communicative practice, and she wonders whether the key of its trustworthiness
could be, precisely, the characteristics of this practice, and particularly, the possibility for
“the collective knowledge emerging from the sort of interactions that Wikipedia allows.”
However, Goodwin says that “[…] it is not that Wikipedia fails to live up to the standards
of “emergent social knowledge”; it is instead that these standards simply do not apply”
2

All these are reasons for disbelieving what someone says. Notice, on the other hand, that there are only
two causes for a false testimony: that the speaker is wrong, or that she aims at deceiving us.
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(2009, p. 7). For, as she argues, nothing in it grants the sort of Darwinian processes that
would amount to a warrant for the outcome: the article that we finally read does not have
to be the result of a progressive improvement of an original one or the survivor of an
epistemological process. Rather, sometimes it is just “whatever the most recent editor
decided to say and to leave alone” (2009, p. 6) or even a deceptive amalgam of
incoherent opinions (2009, p. 7).
Finally, Goodwin argues against what we can take to be the most general criterion
for trusting something, namely, the fact that, so far, it has been (mostly) right. This is a
very special rationale for trusting something. For its warrant is an instance of the
inductive principle itself: in thinking that it makes sense to try to justify the
trustworthiness of a source inductively—i.e. that the fact that it has been trustable so far
is a good reason to continue trusting it—we are thinking of this trustworthiness as a
contingent matter. In my view, that explains why Goodwin would not really manage to
avoid a certain appeal to the inductive principle as a rationale for determining the
trustworthiness of Wikipedia. I am going to argue for this in section 7, but I would like to
finish this section just by questioning Goodwin’s reasons for dismissing the idea that a
good rationale for trusting Wikipedia is whether “we’ve found it useful and reliable in the
past” (Goodwin 2009, p. 7).
Against this rationale Goodwin adduces, on the one hand, that we cannot use it
because “as with many forms of testimony, it is difficult, or at least impractical, to test
Wikipedia’s assertions against the facts.” But facts are not our only means for
determining whether a given testimony is right: other testimonies already tested may also
do the work. Actually, most of the times we test testimony not against the facts but
against further testimonies, in a non-conclusive way. Arguably, that would be, precisely,
the way out from the Socratic apparent paradox of expert testimony that Goodwin,
mentioning Walton (1997), recalls: for it is not true that we cannot determine that a given
subject is an expert unless we ourselves are experts too. Certainly, we cannot
conclusively establish that someone knows what she says if we cannot determine that
what she says is true, and if we ourselves are not experts, then we will not be able to tell
by ourselves whether it is true indeed. But we can test the expert’s knowledge by asking
others “alleged” experts about the same topic, and we can test her expertise by
considering, for example, her credentials or the testimony of others about her very
expertise. All this information would provide just an indirect and non-conclusive
justification for believing in her testimony, but it may serve to justify believing so after
all.
Goodwin also dismisses induction because, in her view:
there are many aspects of Wikipedia regarding which the more I find out about them, the less I
trust. In many cases, however, these same features work pragmatically to encourage trust—and
indeed, the more I find out about them, the more I trust. Take as an example the warning
templates. Epistemically, every time I see a flag that the article I’m looking at is disputed, or that it
lacks sources, or that it may be an advertisement—every time I see such a flag, my trust in the
page, and in Wikipedia as a whole, should go down. By contrast, pragmatically speaking these
warnings reconfirm that there is a community out there of people who care about quality. And the
more prevalent the warnings are, the more I’m assured that the community is large, well-organized
and working hard. (2009, p. 15)
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But we can think of Wikipedia’s flags as qualified assertions: in that case, what
we would have to check is whether the qualified assertions are correct, not whether plain
assertions are correct. It is the qualified assertions what would count for determining the
success of Wikipedia, not the bare assertions which, as the flags remark, should induce us
to believe that there are many claims in Wikipedia that are wrong. In my view, what
Wikipedia actually claims when it says “the article x needs further revision” is something
like “x, but not in all its points.”
Finally, Goodwin also says that we do not really use this rationale either.
Certainly, we hardly ever “take a time out and explore whether Wikipedia’s details are
correct” (Goodwin 2009, p. 7). But the truth is that we test Wikipedia indirectly all the
time, for we are permanently acquainted with its increasing success as a website, and this
counts as evidence in its favour: if Wikipedia tended to raise bad results, it is unlikely that
so many people, and in such an increasing number, continued consulting it. That is also
quite a sound reason for trusting contemporary science, in general: if current
developments usually raised bad results, it is unlikely that so many resources continued
being devoted to them and so many technical and expensive projects depended on them.
Of course, this is just a defeasible reason, but a good defeasible reason after all.
Actually, at this point Goodwin does not seem to argue against the inductive
principle as a rationale; she is not saying that this is not a good criterion to test whether a
given source is trustable or not. Rather, what she seems to say is that Wikipedia is
trustable and, nevertheless, it does not meet this standard. However, I think Goodwin
cannot be right that “the experience we do have of Wikipedia’s accuracy is often bad—or
at least disappointing” (2007, p. 8). It cannot be the case that this is the general outcome
of our use of Wikipedia. For, if it were, people would not massively use it as a source of
information, and if they did, they would be irredeemably irrational and Wikipedia could
not be said to be trustable.
Besides, Goodwin says that “even if our experiences with Wikipedia were
satisfactory, the “reductionist” approach cannot account for why it was legitimate for any
of us to start consulting Wikipedia in the first place” (2007, p. 8). But I think this is also
wrong: our first try with Wikipedia might have been done just as a mere try that, only
after many satisfactory experiences, made us to come to believe that consulting
Wikipedia was a good means to obtain information, or that Wikipedia’s information was
mostly right. Our first try would have been irrational if we had trusted Wikipedia without
further information about its trustworthiness. But many of us already had some
information about Wikipedia’s success when we first consulted it. And most of the rest
probably were not “epistemic slouch,” but just curious people. All this, with the
corresponding qualification for each case…
In my view, we do use an inductive rationale as a criterion for determining
Wikipedia’s trustworthiness. But here, induction does not pivot on our individual
experiences, but on all its users’ experiences. Moreover, according to this standard,
Wikipedia seems to be trustable enough, and those believing in what it says who already
know about its increasingly wild usage are rational in believing so.
But Goodwin does not think this is a good way of justifying our trust in
Wikipedia:
None of these approaches makes consulting Wikipedia reasonable. At a minimum, they encourage
us to be agnostic, since the information we’d need to assure ourselves is unavailable; in the worst
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case, they encourage us to caution and distrust. Either trust in Wikipedia is unjustified, or it is
justified on some other ground. But the premise of this paper is that we are right to consult
Wikipedia. (2009, p. 9)

5. GOODWIN’S JUSTIFICATION OF WIKIPEDIA’S TRUSTWORTHINESS
According to Goodwin:
The startling size of and activity around Wikipedia demonstrates that those who are creating it are
deeply committed to the project of providing me with knowledge (indeed, with the sum of all
knowledge). Relying on their conspicuous passion, it is reasonable for me to trust the Wikipedians,
and consult Wikipedia. (2009, p. 11)

Maybe “demonstrates” is a little too big world, but at any rate, Goodwin thinks
that the qualities of Wikipedians’ activity are the right standard to test the trustworthiness
of Wikipedia. And she contends that, according to it, Wikipedia happens to be trustable
indeed. In addition, she says that this is a pragmatic rationale for trusting something, as it
leaves “aside consideration of what Wikipedians know, and examine instead what
Wikipedians do.” (2009, p. 10).
I think it might be a good idea to replace the issue of the trustworthiness of
testimony from the question of what does the witness know to the question of what does
she do. After all, testimonies may be false not only because witnesses do not always
know what they say, but also because sometimes they aim at deceiving us. But
Goodwin’s point is deeper than this: what she says is that we should focus on the way
witnesses present the information that they provide, not only as a way to test whether
their intentions are pure (i.e. that they do not want to deceive us), but also as a way to test
whether they will be able to accomplish such intentions (i.e. that they will be able to
avoid mistakes).
Thus, Goodwin remarks that Wikipedians have a “conspicuous dedication to their
project,” which is to provide us with “the sum of all knowledge” (2009, p. 11). And that
would give us a prima facie reason to trust their intentions. However, she notices, being
faithful to such an ideal may fail to be a reason to trust Wikipedia if its standards for
acknowledging something as proper knowledge do not really qualify. Because of that, her
second step is to test whether Wikipedians have an acceptable conception of knowledge.
That is what she calls “the definition concern.” And she concludes that even though she
cannot tell whether Wikipedians and herself are “in full agreement” about a definition of
knowledge, she thinks that this is not necessary because “the massive effort that
Wikipedians have conspicuously invested in policy-making gives me confidence that
they share my concern for definition; it also suggests that whatever definition they have
(currently) come up with is likely to be sophisticated and well-grounded” (2009, p. 12) 3 .

3

At this point, the question of whether we are considering Wikipedia’s trustworthiness or Goodwin’s
rationality in trusting it becomes relevant: maybe she is not right in being confident just with that
“warranties.” In that case, the fact that this is enough for her would turn rational her trusting Wikipedia;
yet, Wikipedia would fail to be trustable in itself. Anyway, I suppose Goodwin is not actually saying that
Wikipedians’ activity makes her confident that they share her concern about the definition of knowledge,
but rather that we should be confident.

8

COMMENTARY ON JEAN GOODWIN
Yet, having adequate standards to determine what counts as knowledge is not
enough to trust what Wikipedians say. For still remains open the question of whether they
actually meet these standards. But Goodwin thinks that
Wikipedians have developed elaborate methods for policing contributions to the site from those
who don’t share their commitment to provide knowledge to the world” (2009, p. 13).

Moreover, according to Goodwin, Wikipedians are permanently working to overcome
any pragmatic doubts that those consulting Wikipedia might rise,
by developing policies, practices, institutions, and technologies which function conspicuously to
assure me that what I will encounter in a Wikipedia article is the work of people passionate about
giving me free access to the sum of all knowledge (2009, p. 15).

To sum up, Goodwin says:
I do not have much idea of whether any particular Wikipedian knows anything. Nor do I generally
bother to check how accurate the information in an article is. However I do know—because they
insistently communicate it to me--what Wikipedians are trying to do. They tell me that “we love
accumulating, ordering, structuring, and making freely available what knowledge we have in the
form of an encyclopaedia of unprecedented size” (Wikipedia: WikiLove 2009). I can learn about
the policies, practices, institutions and technologies Wikipedians have invented to insure that they
achieve their goal, because they are not only transparent but conspicuously signalled to anyone
visiting the site. Confident that the Wikipedians are committed to providing me with the sum of all
knowledge, I have good reasons to consult the site. I trust Wikipedia on pragmatic, not on
epistemic, grounds. (2009, p. 15)

6. ARE GOODWIN’S CRITERIA PRAGMATIC INDEED?
According to Goodwin, there would be a contrast between pragmatic and epistemic
grounds for trusting something. She contends that an epistemic approach to the question
of trustworthiness will “proceed directly to knowledge, assessing the expertise of the
author(s) or the reliability of the site” (2009, p. 15), whereas the approach that she
endorses proceeds indirectly, not by assessing “the expertise but the trustworthiness of
the authors” (2009, p. 15), considering whether we are “licensed to rely on them to take
care in giving (knowledge) to (us).” In this section, I would like to argue that we should
not call such an approach “pragmatic” but, at it best, “second order theoretical,” for it
amounts to rely on second order standards to theoretically justify the beliefs that we
acquire as a result of consulting a given source. So, let me first propose a general
conception of theoretical and pragmatic justification.
I think of the theoretical justification of a claim or belief as a matter of its
correctness as a description of how things are. Contrastingly, the pragmatic justification
of something (including a claim or a belief) would be a matter of its adequacy as a means
to an end. Regarding their theoretical justification, the main problem with those beliefs
that we acquire as a result of what others testify in standard cases is that they do not argue
for it, i.e. that they do not provide reasons showing their claims to be correct. For if they
did, we would be in a position to solve both the problem of whether it is theoretically
rational for a given individual to believe what others says, and also the problem of
whether what others says is (sufficiently) justified: the former would be a matter of the
9
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coherence of the individual’s appraisal of the reasons that the speaker offered for her
claims, whereas the latter would be a matter of their actual goodness.
But, as it happens with standard cases of testimony, Wikipedia does not offer
reasons for its claims; its entries are not argumentative, but expositive. However, we may
still be theoretically justified in believing what it says. It is by dealing with this
possibility that the question of the epistemological status of the beliefs that we acquire by
consulting Wikipedia turns into the question of which reasons would grant its
trustworthiness, and whether Wikipedia meets them. Goodwin’s answer is to look at what
Wikipedians do. And she says that this amounts to seek for a pragmatic account of
Wikipedia’s trustworthiness.
In ordinary life, we do trust others—and not always, or perhaps even often, on epistemic grounds.
When I deposit my pay check in my bank, for example, I am not relying on my banker’s
knowledgeability to get it back to me with interest. After all, there’s been plenty of evidence
recently that at least some bankers are foolish. Instead, I am relying on my bank’s contract with
me, on the court system which allows me to enforce that contract, and on the federal guarantee
which will hold me harmless if my bank collapses. Let’s call this kind of reliance “pragmatic,”
since it involves assessments of what agents (my bank, the court system, the federal government)
can be relied upon to do. (2009, p. 10)

But, does trusting our bank on these grounds really have the same type of
justification as it has trusting Wikipedia because of what Wikipedians do? Trusting our
bank is a good means to safely guard our money because there is a convenient balance
between its costs, its risks and its rewards. Thus, I would say that we are pragmatically
justified in trusting banks; they are a good deal for guarding money. But I wouldn’t say
that we are theoretically justified in believing bankers when they pretend that our money
is safe in their hands. This belief might fail to be justified if we take into account that
“there’s been plenty of evidence recently that at least some bankers are foolish.”
What about Wikipedia? In my proposed terminology, the sort of justification of
Wikipedia’s trustworthiness that Goodwin is looking for is not pragmatic but theoretical:
she does not want to show that it is a good deal to consult Wikipedia when we want to
know something; rather, she wants to show that Wikipedia’s information is (likely)
mostly right. Thus, when she proposes to look at what Wikipedians do she is rather
offering a rationale for believing what they say. Call it as you wish, but there is a
difference here between both ways of being justified in trusting something or someone: if
we trust a plumber because he has a reputation, we are taking his reputation as a good
reason to believe that he will probably do it well; but if we trust him just because he is
offering a two years guarantee, we are not taking his offer as a reason to believe that he
will do it well, but as a reason for preferring him to do the work, provided that other
conditions do also hold. I think that, in order to grasp this difference between two ways of
being right in trusting, we could say that, in the former case we trust on theoretical
reasons, while in the latter, we trust on pragmatic ones.
Accordingly, we could say that Goodwin is proposing theoretical rationales for
trusting Wikipedia, or if you prefer, that she is trying to determine the theoretical
adequacy of the information that it provides. But not its pragmatic adequacy as a source
of knowledge: for doing this, she would rather have to take into account its costs, risks
and rewards as a means to the end of getting information, so that things like, for example,
the fact that it is for free, that you need internet access or that it has a bad press in
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technical circles—by contrast with the Encyclopedia Britannica—would become
relevant.
Yet, as mentioned above, Wikipedia’s entries are not argumentative, so that we
cannot establish their theoretical adequacy by appraising the reasons that Wikipedians
offer for showing their claims to be correct. That is why we have to appeal to criteria that
are not reasons showing the corresponding claims to be (theoretically) correct, but
reasons to think that these claims might be so. In my view, we should call this type of
criteria “second order theoretical”: they are not reasons directly showing Wikipedia’s
claims to be correct, but rather reasons showing our beliefs in what Wikipedia says to be
correct.
Let me illustrate this point by considering Goodwin’s proposed criteria for
assessing expertise opinion. She says that, if we adopt the pragmatic rationale for trusting
testimony that she is proposing, we “should encourage students to be less concerned
about figuring out who the "real" expert is, for example on climate change, and to pay
more attention to the assurances that the competing experts are offering us. Critical
questions for testing an appeal to expert authority might include:
Why is this person offering you their view?
Can you verify her intentions?
What does she have to lose if she turns out to be wrong?
Are there reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure she will endure these penalties? (Goodwin
2009, p. 16)

But, as I see it, these questions are just attempts at dismissing one of the main
reasons for not believing what another person says, namely, that she wanted to deceive
us: by raising them, we are testing her sincerity. It is sensible to suppose that apart from
testing her sincerity, we would also have to check whether the witness could be mistaken:
for she might be a nice person but completely wrong… But then we are right back to the
most traditional account of the justification for believing testimony. And I think Goodwin
is right in saying that this traditional account does not work in the case of Wikipedia,
precisely because of the “anonymity or pseudonymity of Wikipedia’s editors” (2009, p.
4)
7. CONCLUSION
There is a further reading of Goodwin’s paper. At a certain point, she seems to suggest
that her “pragmatic” proposal would be able to shed light to the reductionist/antireductionist debate
As Richard Moran has argued in an important essay (2006), both reductionist and anti-reductionist
accounts tend to ignore the act of testimony itself, treating it as merely a convenient instrument for
detecting knowledge in other people’s heads. If we had another method for finding out what others
believe—e.g., an epistemometer—we might be able to dispose of testimony entirely. But that
seems odd. Moran proposes instead that we must attend to what speakers are doing when they
testify: namely, taking responsibility for the truth of what they are saying. He is urging, in other
words, what I have here called a pragmatic rationale for trust. As I have argued, a pragmatic
approach works much better than an epistemic approach in accounting for our ordinary practice of
consulting Wikipedia. In Fred Kauffeld’s terms (2003), the entire “speech act” that is Wikipedia—
not just the page of an article, but the conspicuous evidence the site provides of all of the

11

LILIAN BERMEJO LUQUE
Wikipedians’ efforts—licenses a presumption that what I find there is worth consulting. This
suggests that those pursuing projects in the philosophy of testimony should be paying more
attention to the diverse and complex ways speakers can design their talk to provide auditors with
reasons to trust. (2009, p. 16)

But how is this supposed to give a clue to solve the question of whether testimony
is a priori trustable, which is the point of the discussion between reductionists and antireductionists? Certainly, the way a certain performance has been displayed gives us clues
to believe/disbelieve that it is trustable. Such a rationale is, as argued above, a second
order theoretical rationale for believing: even if we cannot know directly whether the
speaker is right, we can still have theoretical reasons for believing her, namely, reasons
showing our belief that the speaker is right to be correct. Among these reasons, we can
take into account different features of her performance, including the way she presents
herself. This is what Aristotle already called the ethic aspect of discourse. But good
rhetoricians are supposed to be able to make us believe in their sincerity, expertise, etc,
and taking this into account, we should be clear that, at their best, appearances are not
enough, as Plato used to warn us against the sophists.
The trustworthiness of Wikipedia is not grounded on rhetorical but on
epistemological criteria: the ethos of the speaker does not warrant our trusting her
regardless of further considerations. People who behave as trustable people do normally
speak the truth. But they may also be good deceivers, and we know it. We are not
necessarily committed to believe people who look trustable. There is just an inductive
rationale for trusting what looks trustable, neither a necessary, nor an a priori one.
In my view, we are right in trusting Wikipedia because there is an increasingly
huge number of other people who use it as a source of “general” information. But if we
came to know that we all were wrong about Wikipedia, continuing believing in what it
says would be irredeemably irrational, no matter how trustable it seemed to us: the fact
that Wikipedia looks trustable is just some evidence in its favor, an evidence grounded on
an inductive principle such as “when people guard its claims, meet such and such
standards, appear in such and such way, etc they frequently tell the truth.”
“Perceiving” or “remembering” are a priori trustable sources of information: if
we know that a given subject has perceived or remembered that p, then we already know
that p is true. Another type of a priori trustable source of information is that of codes of
rules constitutively determining what is right or wrong from one or another point of
view—like, for example, a legal system or the rules of a game. As a source of
information about what is right or wrong, a code of rules is a priori trustable because
there are only extrinsic ways of doubting whether it is wrong to do what the rules forbid:
namely, either doubting whether we are facing the “real” code, or considering a different
kind of wrongness, i.e. a wrongness determined by different rules 4 . An a priori
justification of the trustworthiness of a given source is a justification that proceeds
through a warrant that it is an a priori truth, such as “if someone has seen that p, then the
belief that p is correct.”
I do not have a position regarding the reductionist/anti-reductionist debate; that is,
I am not sure whether there is an a priori warrant showing our believing in what a
witness says to be correct. But I think that, in any case, it is a contingent one: witnesses
4

That’s what we do when we wonder things like “is it right to do what the Law says we have to do?”
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are not necessarily trustable—our eyes or our memory aren’t either, by the way. A
necessarily trustable source of information is, for example, the Bible or the Pope,
according to the believer. For them, it is not an a priori truth that if the Bible or the Pope
says that p, then the belief that p is correct, as this is something that they came to know
after God, allegedly, told them. Yet, they cannot disbelieve what it says; for them, it is
impossible that this warrant is wrong. But Wikipedia is not the Bible. Actually, I think
the best thing about this great project is that it has shown us that authority is not the
ultimate reason to trust.
Link to reply

Link to paper
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